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I COMMENTSI
Adverse Effects of the "Lowest
Responsible Bidder" Clause in Public
Contracts
I. Introduction
In Pennsylvania, statutes governing the award of public contracts'
commonly provide that such contracts shall be given to the lowest
responsible bidder submitting a proposal responsive to the terms of the
invitation for bids.2  This requirement primarily guards against
"favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption in the
awarding of municipal contracts, and [secures] the best work or supplies
at the lowest price practicable . . . . " Pennsylvania courts have
construed these statutes to be for the protection of the taxpaying public
and not for the disappointed bidder."
1. A "public contract" is defined as a contract exceeding $50,000 for the construction,
reconstruction, alteration or repair of any public building or other public work or public
improvement, including heating and plumbing contracts, under the terms of which the contractor is
required to give a performance bond and labor and material payment bond as provided by the Act
of December 20, 1967 Pub. L. No. 385 (1967) known as the "Public Works Contractors' Bond Law
of 1967," but excepting work performed for the State Highway and Bridge Authority. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 1621 (1986).
2. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-751(a) (1986) which provides that:
All construction, reconstruction, repairs, maintenance or work of any nature, including
the introduction of plumbing, heating and ventilating, or lighting systems upon any school
property... made by any school district, where the entire cost, value or amount of such
construction, reconstruction, repairs, maintenance or work, including labor and materials,
shall exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000), shall be done under separate contracts to be
entered into by such school district with the lowest responsible bidder, upon proper
terms, after due public notice has been given asking for competitive bids.
Id.
3. Weber v. City of Philadelphia, 262 A.2d 297, 299 (Pa. 1970) (citing Yohe v. City of
Lower Burrell, 208 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 1965)).
4. See Nernberg v. Adams, 544 A.2d 92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (stating that the purpose
of the lowest responsible bidder requirement is to protect the taxpaying public); R.S. Noonan, Inc.
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Not only must the lowest bidder submit the lowest monetary bid,
the contractor must also be "responsive," which means that the bid must
conform to the contract specifications.' General construction law holds
that any material departure6 from the specifications will defeat a bid and
prevent the contractor from being considered a "bidder."7 Before a
bidder qualifies to challenge the decision of a public agency, the bidder
"must review his bid to ascertain that it was in fact responsive and met
all of the instructions contained within the bid."8 Once the bidder is
determined responsible, the bidder may then, if desired, attempt to
challenge the discretion of an awarding agency.
Part II of this Comment explores the history of the judicial
interpretation of the lowest responsible bidder statutes in Pennsylvania
and the effect of this caselaw on disappointed bidders. Part III discusses
the pros and cons of this current interpretation which affords little relief
to contractors, while Part IV analyzes federal and state court decisions
which, unlike Pennsylvania, have recognized a remedy for a disgruntled
lowest bidder. Part V of this Comment recommends solutions for
Pennsylvania to alleviate problems in competitive bidding within the
contract field so that the state's contractors may be treated more fairly.
v. School Dist. of York, 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960) (explaining that the injury resulting from the
rejection of a bid falls on the taxpaying public and not on the disappointed bidder); Clemson Corp.
v. McKeesport Area Sch. Dist., 487 A.2d 103 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (explaining that these
statutes give the public in a taxpayer's suit the right to demand that the lowest responsible bidder
be awarded the contract but such provisions do not vest a cause of action for breach of contract
damages in the lowest bidder). See also R. & B. Builders, Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 202
A.2d 82 (Pa. 1964); Conduit and Foundation Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 401 A.2d 376 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1979).
5. See Township of Hillside v. Sternin, 136 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1957). The court stated that any
material departure from the specifications stands in the way of a valid contract, and the defaulting
person cannot be classed as a bidder at all. Id. at 269. This is because the requirements are
generally considered to be mandatory or jurisdictional. Id. Substantial non-compliance cannot be
waived by the municipality, but minor or inconsequential variances and technical omissions may be
the subject of waiver. Id.
6. Though it is beyond the scope of this Comment, a problem arises when interpreting what
constitutes a "material departure" and courts are often called upon to settle that issue. See, e.g.,
Greenberg v. Fornicola, 178 A.2d 339 (N.J. 1962); Cataract Disposal Inc. v. Town Bd. of
Newfane, 430 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1980); L.W. Eaton Constr. Co. v. State Div. of Admin.,
398 So. 2d 588 (La. Ct. App. 1980); W.R. Aldrich and Co. v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. One,
114 So. 2d 860 (La. 1959).
7. See Township of Hillside, 136 A.2d at 265.
8. MichaelA. Spero, Rights and Remedies of Rejected Low Bidders, N.J.L.J., May 22, 1986,
at 8.
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
II. Overview of the Judicial Interpretation of Remedies Available to
Rejected Lowest Bidders in Pennsylvania
When the economy is poor, general contractors have a difficult time
remaining financially stable.9 Construction projects are scarce, and
competition is rampant. Contractors depend on public agencies to abide
by the statutes and award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.
To achieve their goal of becoming the lowest bidder, contractors put
extra effort into streamlining their bid, relying on the fact that they will
be awarded the contract if they submit the lowest bid. Public agencies,
however, sometimes decide not to accept the lowest bid as the "lowest
responsible bid" and instead choose a different contractor. 0  The
valuable time and effort of the lowest bidder is wasted notwithstanding
the skill utilized in submitting the lowest bid. The public agency merely
uses the word "responsible" to secure its desired contractor, even if it
means declaring a responsible contractor irresponsible."
No viable remedy exists for the lowest "responsible" bidder in
Pennsylvania. 2 When the government agency decides that the lowest
bidder is not "responsible," the courts in Pennsylvania have left the
9. John Plender, Why Small is No Longer Beautiful: Recession is Wreaking Havoc on
Entrepreneurs Who Prospered in the 1980's, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992, at 9; Neil Hodes, The Role
of Claims Consultants in Construction Disputes, MICH. LAW. WKLY., July 27, 1992, at 29; How
Can a Home Builder Go Bust in a Boom? Ask Fechner Construction, BUS. J. OF MILWAUKEE, Sept.
12, 1992, at 6; Paul D., Builders Find Salvation in Church Work, WARFIELD'S BUS. REC., May 29,
1992, at 1; Kenneth T. Walsh, A Presidential Map of Misery, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar.
2, 1992, at 33.
10. See, e.g., Clemson Corp. v. McKeesport Area Sch. Dist., 487 A.2d 103 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1985) (coal company was the low contract bidder, but school district elected to purchase coal
from another company); Tri-County Motor Sales, Inc. v. Moore, 415 A.2d 439 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1980) (lowest bidder on a dumptruck being sold by the township was rejected on the grounds that
his bid did not meet with all of the specifications).
11. See Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
Haughton, the low bidder on an elevator contract, was considered irresponsible based on his
performance of a previous elevator maintenance contract. Haughton was not present to participate
in the inspection which resulted in the unfavorable report, nor was he given fair opportunity to rebut
the findings. The court found that this was not enough to consider him irresponsible as a matter of
law. Id.
12. Though forums exist for bid protests concerning projects not considered state or local
public work projects, they are beyond the scope of this Comment. However, some of these forums
deserve mention. The forum depends on whether the project in question is a direct federal
procurement by a federal agency or a federal grant project. Concerning Direct Federal Procurement,
three forums exist that have the authority to provide relief to an aggrieved bidder: (1) the General
Accounting Office (GAO), (2) the Federal District Courts, and (3) the Claims Court. The choice
of forum will largely depend upon the type of relief a protester is seeking and whether the protest
is a pre-award or post-award process. Bid Protests: Substance and Procedure on Publicly Funded
Construction Projects 7 CONSTR. LAW 1 (1987).
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contractor no recourse,13 unless the bidder can prove that the decision
was made in an "arbitrary or capricious" manner. 4 The rationale
behind this position is that a disappointed bidder has sustained no injury
which entitles him or her to redress in court," even if the public official
who refuses to award the bidder the contract has a statutory obligation
to award it to the lowest responsible bidder.' 6 Courts emphasize that
the statutory provisions requiring competitive bidding give the public, as
taxpayers, the right to demand that the lowest responsible bidder be
awarded the contract, but that such provisions "do not vest a cause of
action for breach . . . in the lowest bidder."17
Pennsylvania courts also reason that because a taxpayer has a
remedy, the behavior of the public officials will not go unchecked.,'
The courts have further explained that a disappointed bidder has "no
claim of entitlement to a public contract based on the requirement that
the contract be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, since in
Pennsylvania, that requirement is solely for the protection of the
taxpayers." 9 A disappointed bidder may have a remedy if he or she is
13. See R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School Dist. of York, 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960) (stating that 24
P.S. § 7-75 1(a) does not vest a cause of action in a disappointed bidder); General Crushed Stone Co.
v. Caernarvon Township, 605 A.2d 472 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (stating that it is well established
that only a taxpayer has standing to seek to enjoin the award of a public contract to anyone other
than the lowest responsible bidder); Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of
Property and Supplies, 370 A.2d 1210 (Pa. 1977) (holding that in the absence of fraud or collusion,
the rejection of the low bid would not be actionable); Zurenda v. Commonwealth, 405 A.2d 1124
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (holding that in order to maintain a cause of action, a disappointed bidder
must sufficiently allege in his pleadings that the public agency abused its discretion in awarding the
contract at issue); Clemson Corp. v. McKeesport Area Sch. Dist., 487 A.2d 103 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985) (explaining that although statutory provisions requiring public bidding give the public in a
taxpayer's suit the right to demand that the lowest responsible bidder be awarded the contract, such
provisions do not vest a cause of action for breach of contract damages in the lowest bidder).
14. See generally cases cited supra note 13. For holdings of other jurisdictions, see Spiniello
Constr. Co. v. Town of Manchester, 456 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1983) and Riester v. Town of
Flemming, 302 N.Y.S.2d 176 (App. Div. 1969). See generally 10 MCQUILLAN, MUN. CORP.,
29.77 (3d ed. 1981).
15. R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School Dist. of York, 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960) (explaining that it
is unrealistic for disappointed bidders to fear that if the lowest responsible bidder does not have a
cause of action, uncontrolled misconduct of public officers is possible since taxpayers have the right
to object).
16. See Highway Express Lines, Inc. v. Winter, 200 A.2d 300 (Pa. 1964); R.S. Noonan, Inc.
v. School Dist. of York, 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960); Ogden Foods, Inc. v. State Farm Prods. Show
Comm'n, 315 A.2d 329 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
17. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 505 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986). See also Sovereign Constr. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 439 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (holding that a disappointed bidder has no cause of action under Pennsylvania law) aff'd mem.
582 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
18. R.S. Noonan, 162 A.2d at 626.
19. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 497 F. Supp. 625, 627 (E.D. Pa.
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
also a taxpayer in the location in which the project was to take place.20
A taxpaying bidder has standing to seek to enjoin the award of a public
contract to any but the lowest responsible bidder.2 The bidder may
then sue the contractor, expending time and costs of litigation, only to
find that the sole remedy is a court order enjoining the award of the
contract to other bidders and compelling the public agency to allow all
of the contractors to re-bid the project.' The contractor has no cause
of action in damages, nor can the bidder be specifically awarded the
contract by the court.'
The court in Weber v. City of Philadelphid4 accented the
principles of law to be considered when the award of a public contract
is in dispute. The court stated,
First, it is presumed that municipal officers properly act for the
public good. Second, courts will not sit in review of municipal
action involving discretion, in the absence of fraud, collusion, bad
faith or arbitrary action equating an abuse of discretion. Third, on
judicial review, courts, absent proof of fraud, collusion, bad faith or
abuse of power, do not inquire into the wisdom of municipal actions
and judicial discretion should not be substituted for administrative
1980). See also ARA Services, Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 590 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (holding that the rule requiring that the bid must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder
is based on sound public policy and is soley for the protection of the taxpaying public); but see
Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (holding
that bidder on cable television contract for city had property interest in full compliance with contract
specifications once city in fact decided to make award and to non-arbitrary exercise by city of its
discretion in making award, which interest was protected by due process); Teleprompter of Erie,
Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (stating that corporation promoting cable
system sufficiently alleged a property interest in award of its contract for purpose of bringing a civil
rights action).
20. See American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 414 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1980) (holding that the
established law is clear that a disappointed bidder as such lacks standing to sue but one who is also
a taxpayer does have standing in equity to seek to enjoin that award of public contracts allegedly
awarded or to be awarded contrary to law); Ogden Foods, Inc. v. State Farm Prods. Show Comm'n,
315 A.2d 329 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (holding that disappointed bidder who is also a taxpayer
clearly has standing to protest the award of a contract).
21. AmericanTotalisator Co. v. Seligman, 367 A.2d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), aft'd, 414
A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1980). See also Helig Bros. Co. v. Kohler, 76 A.2d 613 (Pa. 1950); Altemose v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Facilities Auth., 300 A.2d 827 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
22. See General Crushed Stone Co. v. Caernarvon Township, 605 A.2d 472 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992); see also Austin v. Housing Auth., 122 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1956); Budd v. Board of Comm'rs,
22 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 1939); Pioneer Co. v. Hutchinson, 220 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1975), overruled
by State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v. Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1979).
23. Ogden Foods, Inc. v. State Farm Prods. Show Comm'n, 315 A.2d 329 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1974) (holding that neither a taxpayer nor a disappointed bidder is entitled to the judicial award of
a public contract to a disappointed bidder).
24. 262A.2d 297 (Pa. 1970).
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discretion. Fourth, if a municipality, in connection with competitive
bidding, is empowered to do so, it may reject any and all bids in the
absence of fraud, collusion, bad faith, or arbitrary action."
The Weber court's interpretation shows how difficult it is for a non-
bidding taxpayer or taxpaying contractor to persuade the court to
overturn the decision of a public agency.
Even if this barrier is cleared and the agency is found to have
abused its discretion, the lowest bidder still has not earned the right to
be awarded the contract.' The court will not issue the contract to the
disappointed bidder, but will issue an injunction prohibiting the public
agency from entering into a contract contrary to the agency's promise to
let to the lowest responsible bidder. 7  This usually leads the public
agency to reject all bide and to submit the project for rebid.29  The
other contractors, now aware of the exact price of the original lowest
bid, realize that their bid must be lower than the one chosen first. The
original low bidder, whom the court declared "responsible" as a result
of the taxpayer's suit, is in no better position than all of the other
contractors and must go through the bidding process once again. After
all of the contractor's efforts in persuading the court to overturn the
public agency's decision, the contractor is left with nothing except legal
fees and a chance to regain what should have originally belonged to the
contractor.
Ironically, this scenario was exactly what the legislatures across the
country wanted to avoid when drafting their respective competitive
bidding statutes.3° Some discretion must be granted to the agency,3
25. Id. at 299 (emphasis in original).
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. Zurenda v. Commonwealth, 405 A.2d 1124 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (explaining that a
disappointed bidder who is also a taxpayer could not seek judicial award of public contract but may
seek to restrain Department of Community Affairs from contracting with competitor); Dayton ex rel.
Scandrick v. McGee, 423 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio 1981) (awarding contract to the second bidder in such
an arbitrary manner constituted an abuse of discretion and consequently city officials were
permanently enjoined from entering into the contract).
28. See Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Property and Supplies, 367
A.2d 374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (holding that a public authority has the right to reject all bids
notwithstanding statutory provisions requiring the letting of a contract to the lowest responsible
bidder).
29. SeeStapletonv. Berks County, 593 A.2d 1323 (Pa. Commw. 1991); American Totalisator
Co. v. Seligman, 414 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1980).
30. Spiniello Constr. Co. v. Manchester, 456 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1983) (courts have recognized
that the ight of discretion does not confer limitless discretion upon the awarding official; rather the
ight has been circumscribed where its exercise would defeat the very object and purpose of the
competitive bidding system); Graydon v. Pasadena Redev. Agency, 164 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (purpose and goal of competitive bidding system is to guard against corruption,
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but "once it is determined which of the bidders are responsible,
discretion ends; the contract must be awarded, if at all, to the one of
them whose bid is lowest ... "32 Presently, public agencies have
avoided getting themselves into the situation of awarding a contract to a
certain bidder by avoiding a declaration that the contractor is responsible.
Instead, agencies simply state that the bidder is not responsible and wait
for a taxpayer to challenge that decision.33 This approach gives the
agency the opportunity to avoid choosing the lowest bidder.
III. Analysis of Pennsylvania's Current Approach to Disgruntled
Contractors
A. Advantages with the Status Quo
The current Pennsylvania interpretation of the "lowest responsible
bidder" statutes does have its advantages. First, the limited available
remedies to contractors reduces the amount of litigation. Contractors
often surmise that it is not worth the time and the effort of pursuing
litigation for the chance of regaining the contract.34 This means that the
public entity will not have to expend money on litigation costs, thereby
saving the taxpayers money in the short term.
In addition, when the public agency loses a suit and is persuaded to
put the contract out for rebid, the taxpayers benefit because all of the
bids are diminished, thereby reducing the price that the public agency
pays for the cost of the project. Finally, allowing the public agency
discretion in deciding who is responsible upholds the separation of
powers between the judicial and legislative branches of government.35
Courts have stated that principles in this area of the law stem, in large
favoritism, and abuse of discretion by public officials in the award of contracts), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 983 (1980).
31. See Schuck v. School Dist. of Baldwin Township, 146 A. 24 (Pa. 1929) (observing that
there is a discretion vested in the board to determine who are and who are not responsible bidders,
and that this sound discretion is to be exercised in a given way); Pearlman v. City of Pittsburgh, 155
A. 118, 119 (Pa. 1931) (noting that "the law requires sound discretion by the directors. They
should investigate the bidders to learn their financial standing, reputation, experience, resources,
facilities, judgment, and efficiency as builders.") (quoting Hibbs v. Arensberg, 119 A. 727, 729 (Pa.
1923)).
32. Schuck, 146 A. at 24. See also Kratz v. Allentown, 155 A. 116 (Pa. 1931) (holding that
discretion of municipality in awarding the contract is in determining who is the lowest responsible
bidder, and contract must be awarded to that bidder, if at all, regardless of difference in bids);
Pearlman, 155 A. at 120 (when municipal authorities determine the lowest responsible bidder,
discretion ends, and the contract, if awarded, must be given to the low bidder).
33. See e.g., Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
34. See supra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
35. See material quoted supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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measure, from judicial respect for the doctrine of separation of powers
in government.16 Because the courts assume that the "municipal officers
properly act for the public good" 37 courts have allowed the states to
make their own determinations as to bidder responsibility, and will not
substitute "judicial discretion for administrative discretion. 38  As a
result, states have the power to act on their own behalf without
interference by the judicial branch of the government. Therefore,
Pennsylvania's interpretation of public bidding statutes has its benefits,
but this interpretation also contains serious imperfections.
B. Disadvantages with the Status Quo
The disadvantages with the status quo considerably outweigh the
advantages. Under Pennsylvania's current interpretation, government
agencies are allowed to reject bids as long as their decision is not
"arbitrary or capricious."39 Consequently, as long as an agency can
find some reason to reject the contractor with the lowest bid, there is no
deterrent to prevent an agency from choosing its favorite contractor.4
This favoritism was one of the evils that the competitive bidding statutes
sought to alleviate.4 ' Also, proving "arbitrary and capricious" behavior
can be difficult since the contracting agency has great discretion.42
Cases do exist, however where abuse of discretion was found.43
36. See Weber v. Philadelphia, 262 A.2d 297 (Pa. Commw. 1970). Certain principles are well
settled in this area of the law and stem, in large measure, from judicial respect for the doctrine of
separation of powers in government. First, it is presumed that municipal officers properly act for
the public good. Second, courts will not sit in review of municipal actions involving discretion, in
the absence of proof of fraud, collusion, bad faith or arbitrary action equating an abuse of discretion.
Third, on judicial review, courts, absent proof of fraud, collusion, bad faith, or abuse of power, do
not inquire into the wisdom of municipal actions and judicial discretion should not be substituted for
administrative discretion. Fourth, if a municipality, in connection with competitive bidding, is
empowered to do so, it may reject any and all bids in the absence of fraud, collusion, bad faith, or
arbitrary action. Id.
37. Id. at 299.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40. New York has also addressed this problem in Anchor Equip. Co. v. Office of Gen. Servs.
of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 783 (App. Div. 1978); J.N. Futia Co. v. Office of Gen. Servs. of New
York, 332 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 1972).
41. See Weber, 262 A.2d at 299 (observing that the requirement of competitive bidding for
municipal contracts guards against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption in
the awarding of municipal contracts). See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
42. See Richland Sch. Dist. v. Central Transp. Inc., 560 A.2d 885 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)
(holding that courts will not sit in review of municipal actions involving discretion, in the absence
of fraud, collusion, bad faith or arbitrary action equating an abuse of discretion).
43. Although abuse of discretion is difficult to prove, there are cases finding such an abuse.
See Kratz v. City of Allentown, 155 A. 116 (Pa. 1931) (holding that rejection of low bid for crushed
stone without any adequate investigation by city was an abuse of discretion). See also Dayton ex
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Even if the contracting agency's behavior is considered "arbitrary
and capricious," the punishment is not severe. Punishment simply
consists of enjoining the grant of the contract to other bidders and
submitting the project for rebid to all of the contractors.' The rebid
will produce lower bids and therefore will benefit rather than harm the
contracting agency. Of course, litigation costs and delay of the project
are major factors to consider, but even with such consequences, there is
hardly an effective deterrent for arbitrary behavior. Hence, the status
quo should be changed to at least provide an incentive to abide by the
requirements contained in public contracting statutes.
An additional problem with the status quo is that each time a
disappointed taxpaying bidder or taxpaying non-bidder prevails on their
claim, taxpayers arguably also suffer.' Statutes requiring the lowest
responsible bidders to attain the contract are for the benefit of the
taxpayers. ' As stated above, it appears to benefit taxpayers when a
project is rebid and the new bids are lower. In the short-term, it means
less money that the taxpayers must pay for the particular project. Yet it
remains to be seen how the contractors can afford to reduce their prices.
They will either have to cut their profit margin or devitalize the quality
of the supplies used to complete the construction. The latter choice
would seem more beneficial to the growing ranks of financially unstable
contractors. 47
rel. Scandrick v. McGee, 423 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio 1981). The City of Dayton violated competitive
bidding laws by awarding a contract to the second lowest bidder. The court found that city officials
acted in an arbitrary manner (1) by not announcing the criterion of residency until after the bids
were opened, and (2) by failing to establish guidelines and standards in the bidding documents for
deciding how much a bid from a resident of the city could exceed the lowest bid and still qualify as
"lowest and best." Id. at 1097. The award to the second bidder in such an arbitrary manner
constituted an abuse of discretion and consequently city officials were permanently enjoined from
entering into the contract. Id.
44. See, e.g., Stapleton, 593 A.2d at 1325.
45. Contracting agencies typically attempt to demean the plaintiff by stating that the plaintiff
cares only about its own business interests and does not care about the contracting agency.
However, this view overlooks the benefits to the public at large by challenges to the rejection of a
low bid. In these challenges, the public is protected because the ultimate goal of public contract law
is preserved by guarding against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, and corruption and by
securing for the public the benefits of unfettered competition. See 10 MCQUILLAN, MUN. CORPS.,
§ 29.29 (3d ed. 1981).
46. See R. & B. Builders, Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 202 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1964);
Nemberg v. Adams, 544 A.2d 92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Clemson Corp. v. McKeesport Area
Sch. Dist., 487 A.2d 103 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Township of Hillside v. Sternin, 136 A.2d 265
(N.J. 1957).
47. See sources cited supra note 9. See also John M. Berry, Fed Officials Give Go-Ahead on
Growth, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1992, at AI; Glenn Kessler and Karen Rothmyer, Can Any of These
Guys Fix the Economy, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1992, at 4; David E. Rosenbaum, A Summer of
Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at Al.
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Methods exist for lowering prices by using substitute materials
which are allowed by the architect, but are not as good as the materials
initially proposed.4" Using inferior materials undermines the quality of
the project, resulting in potential harm to the public. Therefore, a
significant chance exists that the public taxpayers will be adversely
effected in the long run.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of the lack of
deterrence regarding a public agency's conduct in the bidding process in
R.S. Noonan, Inc. v School District of York. 9  The plaintiff in that
case, a disappointed bidder, detailed his concerns about the uncontrolled
misconduct of public officials .'0 The plaintiff believed that because the
bidder was without a remedy, the agency's behavior would go
unchecked." The court disregarded the argument and explained that
the plaintiff's fears were unrealistic. 2 The court also explained that
because taxpayers have the right to inquire into the propriety of conduct
of their public officers and to enjoin unlawful action by them the
behavior of the public officials does not go unchecked." This
reasoning, however, fails to consider that taxpayers rarely involve
themselves in the bidding process since the adverse effects are usually
unknown to them and that the average taxpayer is most likely wholly
unaware of the bidding process.
These shortcomings of the current interpretation of lowest
responsible bidder statutes are a problem both for taxpayers and the
disappointed bidder. Pennsylvania courts have been asked to modify
their stance, 4 but have continually upheld their position. Though
Pennsylvania does not recognize the right of a disappointed bidder to
bring an action, other jurisdictions, including some federal courts, have
48. See, e.g., Michuda & Son Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 422
N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
49. 162A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960).




54. See Zurenda v. Commonwealth, 405 A.2d 1124 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (disappointed
bidder sought a judgment ordering the public agency to refrain from awarding the contract to another
bidder and to award the contract to himself); Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't
of Property & Supplies, 367 A.2d 374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (disappointed bidder alleged that he
was the lowest responsible bidder for a public printing contract and sought a preliminary injunction
restraining the Pennsylvania Department of Property and Supplies from awarding the contract to
anyone other than the lowest responsible bidder), aff'd, 403 A.2d 530 (Pa. 1979); R.S. Noonan, Inc.
v. School Dist. of York, 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960) (lowest bidder brought action against school
district and architect for an order directing school district and architect to award the contract to
lowest bidder, and for damages).
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provided such bidders with standing and a remedy."5 For the welfare
of both the disappointed bidder and the taxpayers, Pennsylvania courts
should take note of the reasoning in these jurisdictions.
IV. Recognition of a Remedy for a Disgruntled Bidder
A. Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania law holds that a contractor suffers no actionable injury
as a result of losing a bid. 6  Other jurisdictions have taken an
alternative view. In fact, in 1980 one federal court interpreting
Pennsylvania law recognized that a disappointed bidder had suffered
injury and was entitled to redress, reasoning that a disappointed bidder
has an interest in the initial bidding process. This case was Three Rivers
Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 7 in which a disappointed bidder
("Three Rivers") for a city television contract brought a suit against the
city. 8 Instead of pleading a contract claim, however, the disappointed
bidder brought a civil rights suit against the city and the company that
was awarded the contract ("Warner"). s9 In count one of its complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that the city's conduct violated its Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the
laws as well as certain provisions of Pennsylvania law' which require
that contracts of this type be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.6
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.'
55. See sources cited infra notes 56-105 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also Sovereign Constr. Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 439 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mere., 582 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1978), cell.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). See also sources cited supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.
57. 502F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
58. Id. Plaintiffs contended that the awarding of the contract was done in complete disregard
of the recommendation made by the two bodies charged with submitting bid evaluations to council,
the Bureau of Cable Communications and the Cable Communications Advisory Committee, that the
contract should be awarded to Three Rivers. Id. at 1121. In addition, Plaintiffs complained that the
resolution (awarding the contract to Warner) completely ignored the fact that Warner's proposal still
contained disqualifying deficiencies. Id. Plaintiffs further alleged that the award of the contract to
Warner was in fact the result of a preconceived plan to favor Warner and to make a sham of the
entire bidding process. Id.
59. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1119.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23301 (1957) (providing "[aill contracts relating to city affairs
shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder, after reasonable notice. When the contract exceeds five
hundred thousand dollars such notice shall be by advertisement; when less than that amount, or when
purchased at public sale, advertisement may be dispensed with.").
61. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1120.
62. Id. Plaintiffs made other claims regarding bid specifications designed to encourage
minority involvement in the bidding process. Plaintiffs claimed these specifications were so vague
and indefinite as to violate their right to due process and equal protection. Id.
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The court initially stated that in order to make out a claim for denial
of due process one must assert and prove that he was unjustly deprived
of a protected property or liberty interest.63 The plaintiffs claimed that
the protected interest of which it was deprived was a property right to
have the cable television franchise awarded in accordance with the
mandates and requirements of the Cable Communications Ordinance and
the Request for Proposals.'M The court stated that "both liberty and
property interests are seen as emanating not only from the Constitution,
but also from state or federal statutory schemes and customs which
create legitimate claims of entitlement to the benefits which they
confer." 65 Regarding property interests, the court stated that to have
a property interest in a benefit, an individual must have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. 66
The court in Three Rivers Cablevision acknowledged that it is
"difficult to precisely delineate the nature and source of the property
interests claimed by [the disappointed bidder]. "67 It used a two-step
analysis for procedural due process issues, first determining whether the
complainant was deprived of a personal liberty or property interest, and
second, determining the nature of the process to which the complainant
was due as a legal prerequisite to any deprivation of the identified
right. 6  The court stated that the protected property interest is the
benefit derived from the award of the contract.69 Both the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Third Circuit have recognized that a
due process interest in benefits sought to be obtained may arise out of the
very provisions regulating their disbursement.70
63. Id. at 1127.
64. Id.
65. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1127 (emphasis added).
66. Id. It has been suggested that in addition to the "legitimate claim of entitlement," a second
factor must be established in order to assert a due process claim: present enjoyment of the benefit.
See JOHN E. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978), at 491-94. The Supreme Court has never
addressed this issue directly. Recent decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
indicate that present enjoyment is not a necessary factor in establishing a due process interest. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Winsett
v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981). The present topic
deals with an attempt to acquire a benefit not yet enjoyed.
67. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1128.
68. Id. at 1128 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
69. Id. at 1129 (refusing to recognize a property right in the procedure itself).
70. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99
(1979). Plaintiffs, who were prison inmates, sought to establish a liberty interest in their future
admission into Nebraska's discretionary parole program. Plaintiffs argued that an interest arose
from the particular language of the Nebraska statute, especially its provision that parole release
"shall" be ordered unless one of four specified circumstances existed. The court accepted that
argument, holding that "the expectancy of release provided in the statute is entitled to some measure
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The court in Three Rivers Cablevision noted that the city had the
right to reject all bids.7 If the city chose to award a contract, it was
required by law to award it to the lowest responsible bidder.' The
court then stated:
Our analysis . . . leads us to conclude that in the circumstances of
this case a property interest of relatively narrow dimensions exists.
Simply stated, that interest was the right of the lowest responsible
bidder in full compliance with the specifications to be awarded the
contract once the city in fact decided to make an award. The due
process to which one possessing the protected interest was entitled
was the non-arbitrary exercise by the city of its discretion in making
the award. And it follows that a deprivation of the substantive
benefit (the protected property interest) without the process due is an
actionable wrong.'
The court concluded that Three Rivers, in its capacity as a bidder,
possessed a property interest in the award of the cable television
contract.
The plaintiff additionally pleaded an equal protection claim under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West, 1979) (hereinafter § 1983), alleging that the
award of the contract was the product of "a predetermined and unlawful
preference in favor of Warner and against Three Rivers."' The
defendants claimed that all of the plaintiff's constitutional claims should
be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to allege that the deprivations
were, in the city's case, the product of some "official policy" as is
required under Monell v. Department of Social Services,7" and in
Warner's case, done "under color of state law" as required by
§ 1983.76 The court rejected defendant's contentions and allowed a
of constitutional protection." Id.; see also Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981). Delaware prison inmate argued that he was denied work release
privileges guaranteed to him through a Delaware statute because certain officials allegedly deviated
from the criteria named in the statute. The court held that an interest arose as a result of the
particular nomenclature of the Delaware program. Id.
71. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1131 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 1131 (observing that "Pennsylvania courts hold that in determining who, in fact, is
the lowest responsible bidder the awarding party must exercise its discretion in a non-arbitrary
fashion."). See also Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 403 A.2d 530 (Pa. 1979);
Zurenda v. Commonwealth, 405 A.2d 1124 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
73. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1131 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1133.
75. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that local government entities may be liable in money
damages for constitutional violations committed by their employees only if those actions implement
"official policy"). The Court noted that official policy included a "policy statement, ordinance,
regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a] body's officers. . . ." Id. at 659.
76. Three Rivers Cablevision 502 F. Supp. at 1135 ("[I]t is true that a private entity's
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claim under § 1983.' The court explained that the plaintiff had a
§ 1983 claim for denial of equal protection78 because of the unequal
application of an otherwise neutral bidding provision.79
The defendants in Three Rivers Cablevision also challenged the
standing of the disgruntled bidder since Pennsylvania had not offered a
disappointed bidder a cause of action against the city.' The court
explained that the disappointed bidder in this case was different because
his cause of action was based on constitutional grounds rather than on
state or federal procurement statutes.8' It stated that "the existence of
standing cannot be questioned seriously with regard to the constitutional
claim raised here,"' and upheld plaintiff's standing.
The court's handling of this case should be applauded. It
recognized that a disappointed bidder had an interest in ensuring that the
municipality was acting in a fair manner. The District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania followed Three Rivers Cablevision in
Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie.' The court in Erie held that
the plaintiff, a disappointed bidder, had sufficiently alleged a property
interest in the award of the contract,' and had standing to bring the
suit.' Thus federal courts interpreting Pennsylvania law had begun to
permit a remedy for the disappointed bidder.
individual action normally would not constitute state action so as to subject it to suit under § 1983.
However, it is well settled that where a private entity acts in concert with a state actor, the former
is also subject to liability under § 1983."). See also Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970);
Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977).
77. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp at 1121.
78. While the court held that the plaintiff had an equal protection claim under § 1983, plaintiff
did not have a claim under § 1985(3) for conspiratorial denial of equal protection. The court also
stated that the plaintiffs claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were not necessary
where all of the relief to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled is available under § 1983.
79. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1133 ("'Though [a] law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution.'") (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374-75 (1886)).
80. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
81. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1132. The court further stated that if the claim
here was statutorily based, it is still likely that standing to bring this suit would exist. Id. The
federal case holding that a mere disgruntled bidder lacked standing, Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113, (1940), is now understood by the Third Circuit and other circuits as tacitly having
been rejected by subsequent Supreme Court cases. See Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973) and cases cited therein.
82. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1132.
83. 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id.
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B. Rejection of the Doctrine of Three Rivers Cablevision
The district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania arrived at
a conclusion contrary to Three Rivers Cablevision in J.P. Mascaro &
Sons, Inc. v Township of Bristol' at approximately the same time. J.P.
Mascaro involved a disappointed bidder on a refuse removal contract.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania required that requests for bids for
a public contract with a township be advertised, and that the contract be
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.' Plaintiff submitted the
lowest bid, but did not receive the contract.' No hearing was granted
to determine whether Mascaro was a responsible bidder and Mascaro
claimed that he was deprived of his property without due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.89 The court held that the plaintiff had no claim of
entitlement to a public contract based on the requirement that the contract
be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.' The court further stated
that Mascaro "failed to demonstrate how the failure of the township, to
either award it the contract or to grant it a hearing, deprived it of its
right to pursue a livelihood." 9'
In 1984, all hopes that bidders would be given rights under
competitive bidding statutes in Pennsylvania were lost with the decision
of ARA Services, Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia.92 There, a
disappointed bidder on a school district food services contract brought
suit against the district, the successful bidder, and individual members of
the school board. 3 The plaintiff alleged that it submitted the lowest
responsible bid and that the award of the contract to another bidder
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as state law. 9'
The court classified the holding in Three Rivers CablevisionP as
giving a disappointed bidder the due process of "the non-arbitrary
exercise by the city of its discretion in making the award."' It also
86. 497 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
87. Id. at 626. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 56802(b) (1980).
88. J.P. Mascaro, 497 F. Supp. at 626.
89. Id. at 627.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 628.
92. 590 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
96. ARA Services, 590 F. Supp. at 627.
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recognized the contrary conclusion of Mascaro & Sons.' The court
decided that the holding in Mascaro & Sons accurately stated
Pennsylvania law, and that Three Rivers Cablevision and its progeny
"gave inadequate consideration to Pennsylvania's long-standing refusal
to recognize a property interest, or injury, on the part of a bidder who
fails to receive a municipal contract." 98  The ARA Services court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege the existence of a
property interest which commands due process protection.' Further,
the court reiterated the theory that competitive bidding statutes are
designed for the protection of the taxpayers and create no rights in
disappointed bidders who are not taxpayers.'0° The court thereafter
dismissed the plaintiffs due process claims.'0 '
Since ARA Services, Pennsylvania courts have not attempted to
protect the disappointed bidder from the arbitrary exercise of discretion
in awarding contracts. 11 Pennsylvania courts refuse to grant the
taxpayer standing and refuse to recognize that the disappointed bidder has
a right in the award of a contract.0 3
C. Another State's Interpretation
The courts of certain other states have decided that a disappointed
bidder should have a remedy. Louisiana law requires governmental
bodies to award certain public contracts to the lowest responsible
bidder. l° The courts in Louisiana agree with other jurisdictions such
as Pennsylvania"°' and hold that the benefit of the statutes accrue to the
97. 497 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
98. ARA Services, 590 F. Supp. at 627.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 628.
101. Id.
102. Three Rivers Cablevision, 502 F. Supp. at 1131.
103. See J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 505 A.2d 1071 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986) (holding that disappointed bidder on public contract has no injury which entitles him to redress
in court, even if the public official who refuses to award him the contract has statutory obligation
to award it to the lowest bidder); Zurenda v. Commonwealth, 405 A.2d 1124 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1979) (holding that contractor, as disappointed bidder, could not seek judicial award of public
contract); General Crushed Stone Co. v. Caernarvon Township, 605 A.2d 472 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992) (holding that only a taxpayer has standing to seek to enjoin award of public contract to anyone
other than the lowest responsible bidder).
104. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2211 (West 1989) (providing that if the public works
project exceeds the sum of $5,000, it must be advertised for bid and the contract must be awarded
to the lowest responsible bidder); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39:1594 (West 1989) (providing that
contracts shall be awarded with reasonable promptness by written notice to the lowest responsive
and responsible bidder whose bid meets the requirements and criteria set forth in the invitation for
bids).
105. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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public rather than individual bidder."°  What differentiates Louisiana
from other jurisdictions is that there, courts are permitted to review
contract award decisions and have allowed an unsuccessful bidder to
bring an action against a state if the agency violated public bidding
statutes,."o
The seminal case that expanded the rights of bidders in Louisiana
is Haughton Elevator Div. v. State.'08 In that case, Haughton Elevator
Division ("Haughton") was the lowest bidder"° on nine elevator
maintenance contracts advertised by the Louisiana Division of
Administration ("Administration") in the spring of 1977.0 Haughton
was not awarded the contracts, however, because the Administration
determined that he was not responsible based on his previous
performances."' The court allowed Haughton to challenge the
decision," 2 observing that Louisiana courts have held that a low bidder
may sue to set aside the award of the contract to another bidder and may
enjoin the agency from the execution of such contract, where the agency
arbitrarily rejected the low bid."3 Louisiana's public bidding statutes
are very similar to those in Pennsylvania." 4 They were enacted for
similar purposes," 5 inter alia, the protection of the taxpayer. Courts
in Louisiana also state that they will not "substitute their judgment for
the good faith judgment of an administrative agency." 1 6 The courts
106. See Millette Enter., Inc. v. State Div. of Admin., 417 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that statutory law requiring that all public work done by public entity be advertised and let
to lowest responsible bidder was enacted in the interest of the taxpaying citizens); see also Kenneth
M. Murchison, Comment, Local Government Law, 52 LA. L. REv. 541, 563 (1992) (stating that
like most courts, the Louisiana Supreme Court has traditionally defined the purpose of public
contract laws in terms of protecting the public fisc rather than in terms of protecting the interest of
contractors).
107. Murchison,Local Government Law, at 563. See also Sternberg v. Board of Comm'rs, 105
So. 372 (La. 1925); St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Mayor and Bd., 99 So. 687 (La. 1924); State ex rel.
Bank of Franklinton v. Louisiana State Bd. of Agric. & Immig., 48 So. 148 (La. 1909).
108. 367So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
109. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2211 (West 1977) (providing that the lowest bidder should
be awarded the contract on public works projects exceeding $5,000).
110. Haughton Elevator, 367 So. 2d at 1164.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1167.
113. Id. See also Steinberg, 105 So. at 372; Standard Highway Co. v. Police Jury, 103 So.
819 (La. 1925); St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Mayor and Bd., 99 So. 687 (La. 1924).
114. Compare LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2211 (West 1977) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
7-751 (a) (1986).
115. Haughton Elevator, 367 So. 2d at 1164 (noting that "[The public bidding statute] was
enacted in the interest of the taxpaying citizen[s] and has for its purpose their protection against
contracts of public officials entered into because of favoritism and possibly involving exorbitant and
extortionate prices.") (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 1165.
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of Louisiana and Pennsylvania differ, however, concerning the unlawful
actions of the public agency. Louisiana courts state that the low bidder
must be given a fair chance to disprove charges of irresponsibility in
order to avoid offending the letter and spirit of Louisiana public contract
law." 7 Pennsylvania courts do not offer the contractor a fair chance
to disclaim the accusation that he is irresponsible because they assign that
duty to the administrative agency." 8  A possible misfortune on a
previous job may be sufficient evidence for the awarding agency to
declare the contractor irresponsible.' Yet Pennsylvania gives no
opportunity for that contractor to defend himself. Rather, the contractor
is found guilty before having the chance to prove otherwise.
The Louisiana court in Haughton protected the low bidder by
providing simple procedural safeguards that are not excessively expensive
nor time consuming to the issuing agency. In fact, these procedures are
in harmony with the public contract statutes. First, they require an
awarding authority intending to disqualify a bidder, prior to the award
of the contract to another, to give the bidder formal notice in writing that
he is potentially going to be disqualified from the contract. 120 This
notice must specifically outline the reasons for the disqualification.
2 1
Second, the bidder must be given the opportunity to respond to these
charges in writing, and where feasible, the opportunity to meet with
officials of the awarding authority to discuss the charges against the
bidder and his response."2 After his "hearing" and before the award
of the contract, the bidder must be given formal written notice that he
has been disqualified from the contract with reasons for such
incorporated therein.' 23 Finally, the "records of this disqualification
proceeding must be preserved so as to form the basis for any subsequent
judicial review which might be sought by the bidder." 24 These
procedures advocated by the Louisiana courts are a way of preserving the
discretion of the public agency along with protecting the rights of the
disappointed bidder. They are cost efficient and not time consuming.
Above all, they provide the disappointed bidder with a chance to disclaim
his label of irresponsibility.
117. Id. at 1165.
118. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
119. See Haughton Elevator, 367 So. 2d at 1164.




124. Haughton Elevator, 367 So. 2d at 1166.
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Under Pennsylvania's method, the disappointed bidder that is
declared irresponsible has no way to shed this label unless it is proven
that the agency acted arbitrarily. This could potentially mean that the
disappointed bidder would be automatically disqualified from the next
contract that becomes available to bid because he was declared
irresponsible on the previous bid. Consequently, the disappointed bidder
may find it extremely difficult to secure employment in the future.
In Haughton,'2 the Agency's reason for declaring the bidder
irresponsible would probably be seen as at least rational by the
Pennsylvania courts, since the Louisiana court's only rationale for
declaring it arbitrary was that Haughton was deprived of a chance to be
heard. 126 Since Pennsylvania courts do not require that a bidder has
a chance to be heard, discretion would have been left to the agency. The
result would have been Haughton's disqualification without any chance
of defense.
When examining the difference between the two systems, Louisiana
maintains the objective of having the statute benefit the taxpayers while
at the same time fulfilling the second purpose of the statute: to protect
against contracts entered into because of favoritism displayed by public
officials. While Pennsylvania courts clearly attempt to protect taxpayer's
rights, they fail to implement policy to prevent the arbitrary use of
discretion and to prevent favoritism.
V. Ideas For Change
Although Three Rivers Cablevision27 permitted the bidder to
challenge the accusation that he was irresponsible by granting him
standing, the solution was not optimal. Problems of time and expense
of litigation would cost the taxpayers more money, and the delay may
have further implications on the project.
The Louisiana courts approached the problem correctly by imposing
a duty on the public agency to grant a "mini-hearing" to the disappointed
bidder, allowing him to disclaim the accusation of irresponsibility. This
method saves litigation costs and also prevents public agencies from
making false accusations. In addition, this method gives the court a
"record" to allow it to rule on motions without actually going to trial.
However, this method also has its problems. First, a hearing between
two adverse parties with no moderation may not accomplish much. It
125. 367So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
126. Haughton Elevator, 367 So. 2d at 1168.
127. 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D Pa. 1980).
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may simply be a preliminary to litigation. Also, no objective observers
are present to determine which party is making its point more effectively.
The parties may adamantly adhere to their own positions so that no
progress could ensue.
These problems lead to the solution that would alleviate the
complications that result from the word "responsible" in public contracts.
The creation of a "pre-certification process," to determine who is and
who is not responsible before the bids are submitted to the public
agency, would solve this problem. Pre-certification can be accomplished
by creating a board of objective engineers, employed by the state, which
would evaluate each individual contractor and either approve or reject the
contractor based on objective factors established by the board.
The board would only need to consist of twelve observers per
geographic area, which would not cost the municipality as much as it
would pay in litigation costs when a taxpayer brings a suit to enjoin a
contract from being awarded. All decisions made by the board would be
final and reviewable by the courts only when there is not substantial
evidence in the record to support the decision. There would be a time
limit for board membership in order to prevent any favoritism that could
occur by becoming too familiar with either the contractors of those on
the agency.
This procedure has been attempted in the past. In Stapleton v.
Berks County, 28 Berks County began its process of selecting a
contractor to provide waste disposal services with the county's "Request
for Qualifications" (RFQ). 29 That request required participating firms
to have substantial financial resources and disclose any convictions or
alleged transgressions of environmental and municipal contracting
laws. 30  The purpose of the request was to ensure that those
participating in the process were "reputable and financially secure."3'
The RFQ identified six companies as qualified bidders.'32 The RFQ
had other duties under the specific Act,'33 but had the arguably correct
idea to pre-certify those who would bid the project. This pre-
certification process could be a solution to long-standing problems with
competitive bidding statutes. Cost is minimal when compared with
litigation costs and it will forever end the problems with arbitrary use of
128. 593 A.2d 1323 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
129. Id. at 1324.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1325.
133. Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act of July 28, 1988, Pub. L.
No.556, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.101-4000.1904.
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discretion by public agencies. In the alternative, Pennsylvania must
recognize that a bidder has a right to have his or her bid given fair and
equal treatment. If this right is violated, the courts should afford the
bidder a remedy as the Third Circuit has done in the past and as
Louisiana currently recognizes.
VI. Conclusion
Our contractors are too important to be overlooked when their rights
are in jeopardy. Most citizens have a remedy if they are discriminated
against and contractors should be no exception. Competitive bidding
statutes were implemented to protect the public and to prevent
favoritism. The courts have appropriately addressed the first goal of this
statute by allowing the taxpayer to object in case of injustice. It is time
that the courts of Pennsylvania begin giving due consideration to the
second objective of the statute - namely, to prevent favoritism.
Matthew Cosenza

